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During its “Cablegate” campaign, the WikiLeaks website released a U.S. Department of
State list of world-wide assets vital to the United States created under the Critical Foreign
Dependencies Initiative (CFDI). This paper evaluates the entries in the CFDI list relative to
various deﬁnitions of critical infrastructure pertaining to homeland security, and past
patterns of terrorism attacks on categories within the CFDI as recorded by the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD) over the past 40 years. It is found that what the United States
identiﬁes as critical international infrastructure differs signiﬁcantly from what is deﬁned
as the national critical infrastructure. Moreover, the geospatial distribution of foreign
infrastructure identiﬁed as critical by the United States differs substantially from the past
patterns of terrorist attacks on similar entities. Finally, examining the GTD for the years
subsequent to the WikiLeaks release reveals that there is little evidence to substantiate
that WikiLeaks provided a “to-do” list for terrorists intending to attack critical infrastruc-
ture assets as was claimed by some U.S. government ofﬁcials.
& 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
During December 2010, the WikiLeaks website – founded by
Julian Assange – released the U.S. Department of State secret
Cable 09STATE15113 sent to then-Secretary-of-State, Hillary
Rodham Clinton, which contained a list of worldwide assets
vital to the United States. The list was created under the
“Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative,” hereafter referred to
as CFDI. The CFDI list was compiled by U.S. embassies and
includes potential terrorism targets such as points of entry
and rail crossings between the U.S. and Canada and between
the U.S. and Mexico; dams and nuclear power plants that
supply electricity from these two countries to the U.S.; private
foreign companies across the globe in the areas of biotechnol-
ogy, defense procurement, energy manufacturing and phar-
maceuticals; a wide array of entities in the supply chain of
natural gas and petroleum (export terminals, oilﬁelds, pipe-
lines, reﬁneries and straits); select ports in Asia and Europe;Elsevier B.V. This is an op
nd/4.0/).and telecommunications assets such as transoceanic cable
landings and satellite earth stations. The CDFI list, which is
summarized in Table 1, has more than 200 individually-
identiﬁable entities.
Opinions about the impact and risks associated with the
WikiLeaks release of the CFDI list vary greatly. These range
from claims that nothing new was revealed because informa-
tion about the targets is publicly available to the U.S. govern-
ment's condemnation of the release as a to-do list for
terrorists. Cable 09STATE15113 itself asserts that if the assets
on the list were to be destroyed, disrupted or exploited, there
would be an immediate and deleterious effect on the United
States. Assange's own rationale for releasing the CFDI cable
was two-fold [7]:
“To further show that U.S. diplomats were being illegally
used to conduct foreign spying (it is explicitly stated in the
cable to keep such inquiries secret from the hosten access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
Table 1 – Critical infrastructure assets in the CFDI list.
CDFI list entries Sites
Biotech, chemical and pharmaceutical private
businesses
43
Defense weapons/components private contractors 13
Electrical power generating sites 12
Energy component private manufacturers 14
Mining 19
Oil and gas production, storage and transportation 24
Points of entry into the U.S. (PoEs) 22
Telecommunications 28
Transportation and shipping 32
Total 207
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ﬁght a war over or otherwise use its diplomatic muscle to
control.”
In Hastedt's [16] taxonomy of the patterns of public
intelligence, this statement corresponds to a promotional
leak, which seeks to draw attention to oneself or to a policy
problem. Moreover, the information contained in the CFDI list
was not contested by the U.S. government. The direct release
of the CFDI list by WikiLeaks itself was a one-time break
within the context of WikiLeaks’ pattern of diplomatic cable
releases during 2010, known as “Cablegate.” The large Cable-
gate cache (some 250,000 cables) was ﬁrst released privately
by WikiLeaks in tranches to news outlets such as Der Spiegel,
El País, The Guardian (which passed them on to the New York
Times) and Le Monde [6,7]. Once these outlets established the
authenticity, veracity and sensitivity of the diplomatic cables,
they published redacted versions that were deemed to be
newsworthy. As Michael [24] notes, by late 2011, the unre-
dacted cables were made available when the passphrase used
to decrypt the cables was unintentionally made public by a
reporter. Consequently, the cables are now downloadable as a
searchable database.
The U.S. Department of Justice considered charging
Assange with the crime of “communicating with the enemy,”
just as it charged U.S. Army Private Manning, who originally
passed the cables to WikiLeaks. In July 2013, Private Manning
was acquitted of this charge, but was convicted of lesser
charges such as violations of the Espionage Act, using classi-
ﬁed information for other than its intended purposes and theft
of government property. In August 2013, Manning was sen-
tenced to 35 years in prison.
In order to further limit the release of information potentially
damaging to the U.S. by WikiLeaks, several restrictive measures
were taken by private commercial entities apparently in
response to unofﬁcial exhortations by U.S. Senate Homeland
Security Committee Chair, Joseph Lieberman:WikiLeaks' domain
name provider dropped its service after a large-scale distributed
denial-of-service attack on WikiLeaks; Amazon denied Wiki-
Leaks access to its cloud-based web hosting service; Apple pulled
a WikiLeaks app from its App Store; credit card companies and
PayPal stopped processing donations to WikiLeaks; and INTER-
POL issued notices seeking Assange for questioning in connec-
tion with rape charges in Sweden [7] (this revelation was itself aleak). Note that Benkler [7] maintains that there is no clear
evidence that these acts were done at the direction of or coercion
by a government ofﬁcial.
The vast majority of the academic literature on WikiLeaks
considers the legality of the larger Cablegate cache of releases
and the risks and ill effects of disclosing classiﬁed documents.
Moreover, the candid assessment of conditions abroad in the
cables caused considerable embarrassment and diplomatic
difﬁculties for the U.S. and foreign governments. The consen-
sus is that nothing new was learned from Cablegate, with the
impact having to do with suspicions being conﬁrmed via
leaked ofﬁcial sources. At the same time, several experts
surmise that the diplomatic cable assessments of Arab leaders
had a role to play in the Arab Spring of 2011. Indeed, Bachrach
[5] is among many who observe that the seeds of revolution in
Tunisia were sown a month before the uprising via a Wiki-
Leaks release of a dispatch by U.S. ambassador Robert Godec,
which documented the greed and massive corruption of
Tunisian president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, and his family
(also see [15]).
Prior to Cablegate, the WikiLeaks release of the Afghan War
Diary raised concerns that reprisals would be enacted against
persons identiﬁed in the reports. These concerns were see-
mingly validated by Taliban insurgents who threatened to
decapitate the Afghan collaborators whose anonymity had
been compromised by the publication of uncensored informa-
tion from the Afghan War Diary [29]. Fenster [15] has used
publicly-available media sources to establish that no indivi-
duals identiﬁed (or inferred) as U.S. intelligence sources or
military or diplomatic personnel in the Cablegate documents
have come to harm, although he does note that it is possible
that such evidence exists in classiﬁed documents. Danielson
[14] points out that Cablegate did result in the withdrawal of
several U.S. diplomats as well as the resignation of the U.S.
ambassador to Mexico. Hosenball [17] cites two U.S. intelli-
gence ofﬁcials as saying that they were aware of speciﬁc cases
where the damage caused by Cablegate was assessed as
serious to grave, although they could not discuss the subject
matter because it was still highly classiﬁed.
Internal U.S. government reviews corroborate that Cable-
gate caused only limited damage to U.S. interests abroad [17].
Subsequently, in cooperation with the London-based Iraq Body
Count, WikiLeaks created an automated program for redacting
names within documents to minimize reprisals against
human assets. WikiLeaks had been previously criticized for
insufﬁciently redacting names in its release of the Afghan
War Diary.
With respect to the CFDI list itself, left unaddressed are the
issues of what was used to construct the list, what the list
reveals about what the U.S. identiﬁes as critical assets on
foreign soil, and whether it can be used as a to-do list for
terrorists, as has been claimed. This is the subject of the
present paper.
In constructing the CFDI list, U.S. diplomatic missions
needed to have a working deﬁnition of the critical infrastruc-
ture and past patterns of attacks on critical infrastructure
assets. To this end, the CFDI list is compared with the more
than 110,000 entries in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
related to domestic and transnational terrorism incidents from
1970 through 2010, corresponding to the period prior to the
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1970–1997 was collected by Pinkerton Global Intelligence
Service to provide risk analysis advice to private business
[10], so the use of the GTD for assessments of the CFDI list is
not inconsistent with the GTD's original purpose. Pinkerton
donated the dataset to the National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the
University of Maryland in 2001, after which START has
expanded and updated the dataset. The GTD is used instead
of other readily-available datasets such as International Ter-
rorism Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) because it
includes both domestic and transnational terrorist events.
Presumably, an entity made the CFDI list because a successful
terrorist attack against the entity would have adverse con-
sequences for the United States. Whether it is domestic or
transnational terrorist activity that brings about this compro-
mise is less of a concern than the ultimate integrity of
the asset.
The analysis presented here was not possible until now
due to the passage of time necessary for events to unfold in
the wake of the WikiLeaks release in December 2010 and also
the additional time needed by START to compile and release
the GTD terrorism data. Consequently, this study is based on
almost 40 years of data on terrorism patterns and how they
relate to the target categories in the CFDI list and four years'
worth of GTD data from 2011–2014 for terrorist events sub-
sequent to the WikiLeaks release (as is well-known, the 1993
data are missing from the database).
Previous data-based analyses of the effects of WikiLeaks
have instead focused on the subject of insurgency. For exam-
ple, in October 2010, WikiLeaks released U.S. military records
of SIGNATS (i.e., signiﬁcant activities) that chronicle the
casualties observed by U.S. military personnel in Iraq. Bohan-
non [9] reports that the difference between the casualties
given in SIGNATS and those recorded by the Iraq Body Count
(IBC) caused the IBC to raise its estimates of civilian deaths
from a range of 98,585 to 107,594 by another 15,000. This
created further support for critiques of the 2006 Lancet II study
that estimated more than 600,000 violent deaths during the
ﬁrst three years of the Iraq War [28]. Linke et al. [21] have used
SIGNATS to establish a tit-for-tat association between events
initiated by U.S.-led coalition forces and insurgent responses
in Iraq. Finally, Zammet-Mangion et al. [31] have used the July
2010 WikiLeaks release of the U.S. military's Afghan War Diary
for 2004–2009 to spatially model the growth of conﬂict inten-
sity: they report that their model accurately predicts (in a
statistical sense) conﬂict dynamics in Afghanistan for 2010 – a
year after the end of the data in the Afghan War Diary upon
which their model is based.
Unlike SIGNATS and the Afghan War Diary, the CFDI list is
not itself a collection of incidents of conﬂict. Instead, the
construction of the CFDI list can be regarded as an exercise
meant to identify potentially vulnerable foreign assets deemed
as critical by the U.S. Department of State. The purpose of this
paper is to independently assess the CFDI list and the effects
of its release. The next section discusses the meaning of the
term “critical” in the CFDI list by comparing the categories in
the list with those in the U.S. government's initial deﬁnition of
critical infrastructure subsequent to the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing of 1995 and the reformulation of the deﬁnition of criticalinfrastructure in the USA PATRIOT Act subsequent to the
terrorist actions of September 11, 2001. Section 3 provides a
trends/patterns and frequency assessment of the CFDI list by
comparing the geographical dispersion of CFDI list categories
with GTD data. Section 4 identiﬁes the (very few) targets in the
CFDI list that subsequently experienced terrorist attacks.
Section 5 includes an extensive discussion of the results of
the analyses and Section 6 presents the conclusions and
avenues for future research.2. What is meant by critical?
No claims have been made by the U.S. government against the
authenticity of the CFDI list [7]. All the targets in the list appear
to be reasonable; no target appears to be susceptible to the
criticism of pork-barrel spending that has characterized a
subset of the Department of Homeland Security's domestic
expenditures on terrorism preparedness, because a proportion
of the funds are allocated according to electoral votes per capita
rather than an assessment of vulnerabilities [12]. For example,
the CFDI list of sea ports includes six of the top 10 ports in
terms of metric tons of cargo (no U.S. port ﬁgures in the top ten).
The CFDI list is the international analog of various attempts by
the U.S. government to identify critical domestic infrastructure
assets subsequent to large-scale terrorist events. Indeed, Acker-
man et al. [1] present nine pages of alternative U.S. government
deﬁnitions of the critical infrastructure. This section compares
the entries in the CFDI list with the evolution of the U.S.
government's deﬁnition of critical infrastructure over the past
20 years.
The use of a fertilizer-ingredient-based bomb in 1995 to
strike against the U.S. government through the destruction of
the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is an illustration
of how devastating a low-tech terrorist attack can be. The
bombing destroyed or damaged more than 300 buildings,
killed 168 persons, wounded approximately 700 others and
caused $652 million in damage. In the aftermath of the
Oklahoma City Bombing, the Clinton Administration enacted
Executive Order 13010 of 1996 on Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion, thereby establishing a joint public–private commission to
develop a national strategy for protecting critical infrastruc-
tures and ensuring their continued operation. President Clin-
ton's Executive Order 13010 deﬁnes critical infrastructure as [1]
Telecommunications; electrical power systems; gas and
oil storage and transportation; banking and ﬁnance; trans-
portation; water supply systems; emergency services
(including medical, police, ﬁre, and rescue); and continuity
of government.
Table 2 compares the Clinton categories with the entries in
the CFDI list. There is minimal overlap. The CFDI list includes
no entries in banking and ﬁnance, or emergency services. Fully
42% of the CFDI list does not in any way correspond to the
Clinton list. In some sense, this is not surprising because the
CFDI list was created thirteen years after the Clinton deﬁnition
of critical infrastructure was formulated. Subsequent events
have enhanced the recognition of plausible terrorist targets.
For this reason, the deﬁnition of critical infrastructure given in
the USA PATRIOT Act is considered.
Table 2 – Clinton critical infrastructure categories in the CFDI list.
Clinton categories CDFI percentage
Banking and ﬁnance 0
Electrical power systems (and water supply) 6
Emergency services 0
Information and telecommunications 14
Oil and gas production, storage and transportation 12
Transportation and shipping (PoEs, Straits, Ports) 26
Non-Clinton category items 42
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the protection of the critical infrastructure as one of six
homeland security missions. The act deﬁnes critical infra-
structure as [1]
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public
health, or any combination of these matters.
Table 3 presents and compares the speciﬁc categories of
systems and assets identiﬁed in the USA PATRIOT Act with
those in the CFDI list. The USA PATRIOT Act much more
closely captures the content of the CFDI list, as should be the
case given that the instructions to diplomats in Cable
09STATE15113 included the USA PATRIOT Act deﬁnition of
critical infrastructure. Many of the Department of Homeland
Security/PATRIOT categories that are not in the CFDI list are
domestic in nature and it is logical that they do not appear
as foreign dependencies. The CFDI items that do not appear
as Department of Homeland Security/PATRIOT categories are
private ﬁrms that produce vital components for energy
production (7% of the CFDI list) and foreign mines (9%).
Paragraph 8 of Cable 09STATE15113 identiﬁes three criteria
for determining if an asset in a host country should be
included in the CFDI list: direct physical linkages (e.g., pipelines, undersea telecom-
munications cables, and assets located in close enough
proximity to the U.S. border [sic] their destruction could
cause cross-border consequences, such as damage to
dams and chemical facilities); sole or predominantly foreign/host-country sourced goods
and services (e.g., minerals or chemicals critical to U.S.
industry, a critical ﬁnished product manufactured in one or
only a small number of countries, or a telecom hub whose
destruction might seriously disrupt global communica-
tions); and critical supply chain nodes (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz and
Panama Canal, as well as any ports or shipping lanes in
the host-country critical to the functioning of the global
supply chain).
Table 4 presents the categories that the Department of
State has identiﬁed as critical; these categories actually appear
in the CFDI list. Of the categories not discussed above,
chemical industry refers to locations where the essentially
irreplaceable production of key chemicals occurs. Energycomponent private manufacturers include facilities where
hydroelectric dam turbines, power transformers, electrical
generators and components, and gears and gearboxes for
power systems are manufactured. Defense weapons/compo-
nents contractors range from producers of armored vehicles
and warheads to machine fabrication and tool manufacturers
to precision watch and clock makers. Mining includes installa-
tions where chromite, cobalt, germanium, graphite, iodine,
manganese, palladium, platinum and tin are extracted. Public
health refers to foreign biotech and pharmaceutical facilities
where antivenins, insulin, medical radioisotopes, polypropy-
lene ﬁlter material for N-95 (surgical) masks, specialty plasmas
and vaccines (foot and mouth, inﬂuenza, polio, smallpox, etc.)
are produced.
Table 5 presents the geographical dispersion of entries in the
CFDI list. Western Hemisphere refers to the Americas excluding
the United States. Outside of Canada and Mexico, the Western
Hemisphere CFDI entries are transoceanic cable landings,
mines, a liquid natural gas processing facility in Trinidad and
Tobago, a livestock pharmaceutical facility in Argentina and the
Panama Canal. Asia and the Paciﬁc are likewise characterized
by cable landings and mines, but also include sea ports and
straits. All of the CFDI list categories are found in Europe and
Eurasia. As expected, the entries for Near/Middle East and
Africa reﬂect concerns about natural resources. The Near/
Middle East is dominated by oil and gas production, storage
and transportation; and shipping (oil terminals and straits). All
the entries for Africa are mines, with the exception of two
South African defense and energy contractors.3. Comparing CFDI-speciﬁc target categories
with GTD data
It is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to predict a single terrorism
event or to identify a speciﬁc target that is on the to-do list of
a terrorist organization. The CFDI list embodies a “no sur-
prises” approach by proactively identifying the foreign assets
whose loss would critically impact the public health, eco-
nomic security and/or homeland security of the United
States. Intelligence analysis typically involves three meth-
odologies for evaluating forecasts of this sort: (i) probability;
(ii) trends and patterns; and (iii) frequency. One categoriza-
tion of probability that is pervasive in the intelligence com-
munity is that something is conceivable/remote if it is a low
probability event; it is possible/unlikely if the chance of it
happening is less than 50%; its chances are 50:50; it is likely if
its probability is in the 60–70% range; and it is almost likely if
Table 3 – DHS/PATRIOT Act critical infrastructure categories in the CFDI list.
DHS/PATRIOT Act categories CDFI percentage
Agriculture, banking and ﬁnance 0
Chemical industry 1
Critical manufacturing 12
Emergency services and government 0
Information and telecommunications 14
Oil and gas production, storage and transportation 12
Public health 19
Transportation and shipping (PoEs, Straits, Ports) 26
Non-DHS/PATRIOT Act category items 16
Table 4 – Categories identiﬁed as critical in the CFDI list.
CDFI list categories Number Percentage
Chemical industry 3 1
Defense weapons/components contractors 13 6
Electrical power systems (dams and nuclear sites) 12 6
Energy component private manufacturers 14 7
Mining 19 9
Oil and gas production, storage and transportation 24 12
Public health (Biotech and Pharmaceutical Businesses) 40 19
Telecommunications 28 14
Transportation and shipping (PoEs, Straits, Ports) 54 26
Total 207 100
Table 5 – Geographical dispersion of entries in the
CFDI list.
CDFI list location Number Percentage
Asia and Paciﬁc 30 14
Europe and Eurasia 78 38
Near/Middle East and Africa 31 15
Western hemisphere 68 33
Total 207 100
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between the CFDI list and this estimative language will be
given subsequent to analyzing past patterns of terrorist
attacks on entities of the types that are enumerated in the
CFDI list. The GTD dataset is used for this purpose. This is
because the GTD records both domestic and international
events and either type of event has the potential to compro-
mise a target in the CFDI list. This facilitates the identiﬁcation
of whether CFDI-type targets have been at risk in the past.
This paper focuses on three types of targets: (i) biotech/
pharmaceutical facilities; (ii) critical manufacturing (i.e., def-
ense/energy contracting); and (iii) chemical facilities. This focus
is consistent with the original intent of Pinkerton's data for
assessing business risk that created the foundation of the GTD. It
is also consistent with the pecking order of terrorist target
selection [11], which begins with government/military targets;
as these are hardened, moves on to private companies; and, as
these are hardened, moves on to the citizenry. Citizens do not
appear in the CFDI list but private companies certainly do.Moreover, entities such as straits, ports and oil and gas pipelines
are classic geopolitical concerns that are often government-
owned and/or protected. From a geostrategic perspective, what
is new in the CFDI list are the private enterprises in chemicals,
biotech/pharmaceuticals and defense/energy contracting; and
transoceanic cable landings and satellite earth stations. The
focus on the business entities in this paper makes sense because
the GTD contains no records of attacks on transoceanic cable
landings or satellite earth stations.
Table 6 compares the geographical distribution of biotech
and pharmaceutical businesses with GTD-recorded attacks
against biotech and pharmaceutical businesses outside of the
United States for 1970–2010. Note that when searching the
GTD database, attacks and kidnappings of executives and
personnel at these locations were excluded because they are
of interest only if a terrorist attack disrupts production.
Relative to the historical pattern of attacks in this category,
the CFDI list is clearly an overestimate – it identiﬁes 40
facilities whereas the GTD data provides evidence of 13
attacks of this type. The CFDI list is also Euro-centric in that
it emphasizes European facilities (80%), whereas the histor-
ical attacks occurred with equal frequency in Europe and in
the Western Hemisphere. The emphasis on Europe can be
attributed to the preponderance of vaccine producers in
Western Europe. In addition, no speciﬁc type of terrorist
group has consistently selected biotech/pharmaceutical ﬁrms
as targets. For example, there are just as many attacks by
animal rights organizations as there are by Islamic militants
(two each). Four of the attacks are also found in the ITERATE
codebooks, implying that they are instances of transnational
terrorism.
Table 7 – Target: critical manufacturing facilities.
CDFI list location CDFI percentage GTD attacks percentage
Asia and Paciﬁc 15 13
Europe and Eurasia 44 56
Near/Middle East 4 6
(South) Africa 7 6
Western hemisphere 30 19
Number of observations 27 32
Table 6 – Target: biotech and pharmaceutical facilities.
CDFI list location CDFI percentage GTD attacks percentage
Asia and Paciﬁc 7 15
Europe and Eurasia 80 31
Near/Middle East and Africa 0 23
Western hemisphere 13 31
Number of observations 40 13
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contractors because they constitute what Cable 09STATE15113
categorizes as critical manufacturing. The CFDI and GTD data
appear more similar as compared with Table 6. While in
Table 6 no biotech/pharmaceutical targets were accounted
for in the CFDI data in the Near/Middle East and Africa, in
Table 7, Israeli and South African defense/energy manufac-
turers are accounted for in the CFDI data and this accounting
mirrors the distribution of previous patterns of attacks in
these areas. In contrast to the biotech/pharmaceutical targets,
the CFDI data for critical manufacturing is less Euro-centric
than the GTD pattern of attacks suggests. The CFDI data
reﬂects the global nature of defense contracting as well as
the greater role of Japanese ﬁrms in the energy sector. Not
surprisingly, the most common perpetrators of attacks on
these private ﬁrms were terrorists associated with communist
factions/anti-capitalist groups (nine instances). Furthermore,
attacks on this type of target have been tapering off, with 66%
occurring before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – a period
known for the preponderance of state-sponsored terrorism as
a proxy for the Cold War – and only two attacks occurring
after 9/11.
The ﬁnal category considered is chemical facilities. Three
facilities made the CFDI list: BASF's Ludwigshafen facility in
Germany, which is the world's largest integrated chemical
complex; Siemens' Erlangen complex in Germany, a poten-
tially irreplaceable producer of key chemicals; and a hydro-
ﬂuoric acid production facility (a precursor in the production
of myriad chemicals) in Canada.
Table 8 summarizes the GTD data on chemical facility
attacks. The sparseness of the number of events is in some
sense a reﬂection of the foreign nature of the CFDI list because
the U.S. is by far the world's largest producer of chemicals,
petrochemicals and their byproducts. Moreover, the ﬁndings
here are not far off from Kosal [19], who had access to the
publicly-unavailable Critical Infrastructure Terrorist IncidentCatalog (CrITIC) that spans 1933–2004 and includes observa-
tions for the United States. Kosal identiﬁed 21 reported attacks
that were directed at industrial chemical facilities.
Table 8 also presents an analysis of the consequences of
terrorist attacks on chemical facilities. The low damage ﬁgures
are consistent with Kosal [19], who notes that the majority of
attacks on chemical facilities listed in CrITIC employed crude
means for inﬂicting damage. The attack data within GTD are
similar: of the 22 total attacks, 15 were low-scale bombings or
explosions and only four ultimately had the potential to
cripple the facility. The remainder were armed assaults or
unknown methods of attack. By comparison, the chemical
incident at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India
in 1984 resulted in 3787 killed, 558,125 wounded and damage
estimated between $470 and $750 million. It is regarded as the
world's worst industrial accident. More recently, the explosion
of ammonium nitrate at a fertilizer facility in West, Texas on
April 17, 2013 killed 15, injured 160 and destroyed more than
150 buildings. It was the largest loss of life of ﬁreﬁghters (19) in
the United States since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. These two
worst-case scenarios lie far beyond the historical experience of
terrorist attacks on chemical facilities.4. What targets have been attacked?
Given that the WikiLeaks release of the CFDI list has been
criticized as providing a to-do list for terrorists, each of the
CFDI entries was searched for within the GTD from December
2010 through December 2014 (most currently available data).
Examination of the GTD for this period revealed that only two
entries in the CFDI list experienced terrorist attacks. The ﬁrst
occurred on June 26, 2011 at the Basra oil reﬁnery in Southern
Iraq (GTD record 201106260012). The attack, which involved
one Katyusha rocket, resulted in zero casualties, minor
damage (likely less than $1million); the perpetrator and
Table 8 – GTD data on chemical facility attacks.
Location Number
Asia and Paciﬁc 1
Europe and Eurasia 1
Near/Middle East 7
(South) Africa 2
Western hemisphere 11
Total 22
Consequences Casualties
0 1–10 11þ
Killed 18 2 0
Wounded 17 2 1
Damage Minor o$1 Million Major o$1 Billion Unknown
Total 8 2 15
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insurgent activity in Iraq, it would be difﬁcult to conﬁdently
attribute this attack to the WikiLeaks release.
The second entry in the CDFI list is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline in Turkey, which runs from the Caspian Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea. Several bombings targeted the BTC pipeline
in 2012 (GTD records 201205290032, 201207210002, 201208110013,
20120827008, 201210040022 and 201212220010). After each inci-
dent, bomb damage caused the pipeline to be shut down for
several days and exports were halted. The Kurdistan Worker's
Party (PPK) claimed responsibility for some of the bombings; it is
also believed to have been responsible for the remaining
incidents. Once again, there are mitigating factors against linking
the attacks to the WikiLeaks release of December 2010. For
example, the PKK conducted a more debilitating attack against
the BTC pipeline on August 8, 2008, closing it for seventeen days
(GTD record 200808050029). The BTC pipeline was clearly a target
for the PKK before the WikiLeaks release.
Alternative explanations exist for the apparent “safeness”
of entries in the CFDI list. First, the GTD is admittedly
incomplete; for example, given the security concerns, all failed
terrorism attempts are unlikely to be chronicled. Second, the
CFDI list may have worked in that potential attacks were
thwarted in the premature stages because the targets may
have taken appropriate countermeasures. At the very least,
the targets whose inclusion in the list came as a surprise must
by now recognize the need for countermeasures. Finally, the
release of the CFDI list may have actually affected terrorists in
that they seek vulnerable targets that are not in the CFDI list,
making the CFDI a “not-to-do” list.5. Discussion
An important characterization of the CFDI list is that it is
parsimonious and apolitical. A politically-motivated list would
contain far more entries in its attempt to be inclusive. Such a
list might also cause embarrassment upon revelation, yet the
release of the CFDI list did not cause the type of diplomatic
backtracking that accompanied the Cablegate releases of
uncensored assessments of foreign governments. The CFDIlist is reasonable in that it does not reﬂect “weapons of mass
distraction” hysteria or pork-barrel projects/special interests
that, at times, have been used to criticize U.S. Department of
Homeland Security expenditures for protecting targets within
the United States. Importantly, from a counterterrorism per-
spective, the CFDI list contrasts signiﬁcantly with the Joint
House-Senate Intelligence Inquiry of the terrorist acts of
September 11, 2001 [30], which asserted that effective counter-
terror policy requires a full-press defense because terrorists
need to be successful only once. Arce et al. [3] demonstrate
that this type of deﬁnition of success in the war on terrorism
levels the playing ﬁeld for terrorists, who are typically engaged
in asymmetric conﬂicts with much stronger adversaries.
From the perspective of transnational public goods [4], the
instructions for constructing the CFDI list were expressed in
terms of identifying the weakest links. Entries that conform to
this characterization of vulnerability include geographical bot-
tlenecks such as the Panama Canal and the Straits of Hormuz.
Similarly, the three chemical complexes in the CFDI list are the
weakest links in the global supply chain of key chemicals.
However, many entries are inconsistent with the weakest link
criterion and, therefore, their appearance in the list may be
questionable. For example, there are ﬁve Chinese sea ports in
the CFDI list and ﬁve other sea ports elsewhere in Asia. Multiple
ports in close geographic proximity suggest some degree of
substitutability. Moreover, multiple cable landings are listed for
every geopolitical region. The importance of the global com-
munications infrastructure to U.S. security is indicated by the
sheer number of cable landings in the CFDI list. However, many
telecommunication cable systems are self-healing in that they
are designed according to a ring or mesh topology so that no
single cable cut severs any of the nodes from the network [13].
Indeed, Roberts et al. [26] criticize the emphasis on the foreign
landfall of cables, because more vulnerable sites exist inland
where multiple cables come together.
There are also some notable absences in the list. For
example, no CFDI asset is exclusively cyber-related. While it
is true that transoceanic cables carry more than 95% of
international voice and data trafﬁc [13], it is instructive to
observe that there are no analogs to the cyberspace entities
engaged to deter WikiLeaks in the United States' own CFDI
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interest by launching distributed denial-of-service attacks,
denying domain name system service and blocking electronic
payments in order to cripple WikiLeaks re-deploys techni-
ques developed in the war on terrorism in the civilian domain
[8]. However, what can be used in the line of defense can also
be turned into a target, as Visa, MasterCard and PayPal
learned when Anonymous attacked their websites as a
reprisal for cutting off donations to WikiLeaks in response
to Cablegate. Anonymous later took exception to WikiLeaks
itself when WikiLeaks moved documents, including those
associated with Cablegate, behind a paywall, making the
documents no longer freely available.
Several reasons exist for the absence of cyber entities in
the CFDI list. First, due to the manner in which the world's
telecommunication infrastructure has evolved, a large per-
centage of international email and telephone trafﬁc physi-
cally passes through the United States [2]. A notable
exception is a telecommunication switch located in India
that serves the Middle East, but this is not in the CFDI list.
Second, when cyber attacks occur, they are rarely publicly
acknowledged because, by law, they do not have to be
revealed (unless data on private citizens is released) and
cyber attacks are not publicly observable (cyber attacks are
different from cyber espionage and cyber crimes.). Third, no
attacks on information assets that can be qualiﬁed as cyber
terrorism have occurred [22]. Recall that terrorism is con-
ventionally deﬁned as the threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,
economic, religious or social goal by inﬂuencing a larger
audience than the immediate victims through fear, coercion
or intimidation. The targets listed in the GTD satisfy this
criterion. In the case of cyber terrorism, the “threat of illegal
force” manifests itself as acts against the conﬁdentiality,
integrity and/or availability of information systems and net-
works [22]. The closest example of cyber terrorism that occurs
with any frequency in the GTD dataset is the incapacitation
of cell phone towers in remote areas through the use of
explosives or gunﬁre. Documented cyber attacks outside the
United States include the disruption of Syrian air defenses by
the Israeli Air Force; the so-called Stuxnet attacks on Iranian
nuclear centrifuges; the Flame virus/bot that shares code
with Stuxnet and circulated in the Middle East and Europe;
and the blackout in Abbottabad on the night of the bin Laden
raid [2]. None of these acts has been classiﬁed as cyber
terrorism. Instead, they satisfy Lindsay's [20] deﬁnition of
cyber warfare, in that computer network attacks were
employed as a use of force to disrupt an opponent's physical
infrastructure for political or military gain. Because the
United States was involved in at least three of these attacks,
it appears that it is investing in cyber capacity to both defend
and attack critical infrastructure assets.
In addition, all the transportation assets in the CFDI list
are surface-related; for example, no air trafﬁc control centers
are listed. Note also that, although agriculture is a category in
the USA PATRIOT Act deﬁnition of the critical infrastructure,
apart from an agricultural pharmaceutical facility in Argen-
tina, no entry in the CFDI list pertains directly to the food
chain (all the biotech ﬁrms in the list are related to public
health). Yet, the likelihood of a terrorist attack on the foodchain is not altogether different from that of the entries in
the CFDI list [25], and the consequences are also likely to be
very negative.
Finally, one must be pragmatic in realizing the potential
for damage to occur as a result of the WikiLeaks release. The
U.S. reaction to 9/11 is instructive in this regard – it led to the
creation of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet) for sharing sensitive information between the
Department of Defense and the Department of State. An
unintended consequence was that thousands of civilian,
military and government employees had access to SIPRNet,
which is where Private Manning found the documents that
he gave to WikiLeaks. A further consequence was a ruling by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that redeﬁned the
term “relevant,” and apparently allowed the NSA to gather
phone data on millions of Americans. Public awareness of the
NSA's phone surveillance arose from another leak, by Edward
Snowden, an employee of NSA contractor, Booz Hamilton
Allen. The reaction to Snowden's massive leaks will most
certainly result in its own unintended consequences.6. Conclusions
This paper has evaluated the list of vital foreign assets
created under U.S. Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative
(CFDI) and publicly released by WikiLeaks in December 2010.
The evaluation was conducted relative to various deﬁnitions
of critical infrastructure pertaining to homeland security and
previous patterns of terrorist attacks on categories in the
CFDI list as recorded by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
over the past 40 years. It contrasts the foreign targets of
interest to the United States owing to their inclusion in the
CFDI list versus the targets that terrorists have demonstrated
to be of interest, as recorded in the GTD. Fortunately, only
two entries in the CFDI list have been attacked by terrorists
subsequent to the WikiLeaks release. It is unlikely that either
of these attacks, one on a reﬁnery in Iraq and the other on a
pipeline in Turkey, can be connected to the WikiLeaks release
owing to the level of insurgency in Iraq and attacks on same
Turkish pipeline that occurred previous to the WikiLeaks
release. However, it is important to recognize that the GTD is
not all-inclusive because failed terrorist attacks may not be
chronicled.
The results of a geographical comparison of CFDI entries
with the patterns of attacks on their corresponding categories
within the GTD are mixed. Some patterns of attacks reﬂect
different weights of importance compared with the patterns
in the GTD (e.g., biotech and pharmaceutical ﬁrms), whereas
for others, the mapping is quite close between the CFDI list
and the GTD (e.g., critical manufacturing in defense and
energy). Hence, the CFDI list is unlikely to be a product based
primarily on previous global patterns of attacks. One inter-
pretation is that the list is anticipatory, rather than reﬂecting
an emphasis of ﬁghting the last war (on terrorism). Another is
that it is more reﬂective of U.S.-speciﬁc interests in some
categories rather than a global pattern of attack. Moreover, a
low (conceivable) probability does not directly translate into
low vulnerability because a successful attack may have
signiﬁcant negative consequences. In particular, the CFDI list
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the USA PATRIOT Act. For these reasons, the CFDI list is
informative – it gives an indication of the foreign assets that
the United States deems critical. As Mannaugh [23] observes,
the CFDI list shows the discontiguous and nontraditional
character of U.S. spatial vulnerabilities. Indeed, it is not at all
clear that the sites themselves were aware of their own
importance prior to the release of the CFDI list. As a matter
of fact, U.S. diplomatic posts were instructed to avoid con-
sulting with host governments while creating the CFDI list
and to keep the existence of the list secret.
This study identiﬁes the categories of critical infrastruc-
ture assets located on foreign soil that are valued by the
United States. The means for protecting chemical plants
doubtless differ from those used to protect transatlantic cable
landings, ports, energy/defense private contractors, etc.
Indeed, the inclusion of some facilities in the CFDI list turned
out to be news to the owners and operators of the facilities
themselves. Consequently, the risks to many facilities in the
CFDI list remain unknown and research must be directed
toward identifying and quantifying the risks.Acknowledgments
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